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Banking Law: Survey of Florida Developments*
SCoTT L. BAENA AND JANICE L. ROMANCHUCK**
This article analyzes recent developments in the area of
banking law, with special emphasis on the legislative impact.
Among the topics dealt with are interest rate parity, international
banking law, documentary stamp taxes, branch banking and con-
venience accounts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The 1977 developments in Florida banking law reflect, in large
part, the political and economic emergence of the state both nation-
ally and internationally.
Master plans for Florida envision a formidable commercial
complex founded upon a strong financial center. The proximity of
the state to the Caribbean basin makes it particularly attractive to
banks desiring to service that market. However, fulfillment of the
plan depends, in part, upon legislative responsiveness to the needs
of foreign banks.
The backbone of Florida's financial structure will continue to
be its domestic financial institutions. While foreign institutions
have already caused substantial infusions into the state's economy,
* This survey covers the 1977 Regular Session and First and Second Special Sessions of
the Florida Legislature. I
** The authors are associated with the law firm of Helliwell, Melrose & DeWolf, Miami,
Florida.
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domestic institutions continue to service the mainstream. Accord-
ingly, their competitive position must be preserved and also encour-
aged.
With such grand plans for the future, Florida banking law at
the end of calendar year 1976 was virtually embryonic. Development
in Florida's banking law during 1977 tended to be predominantly
legislative in nature. Indeed, the single notable exception, discussed
herein,I to the statutory development of Florida's banking law, itself
engendered a legislative response.
The tenor of 1977 banking legislation was relatively consistent
and evidenced two predominant movements. The legislation was
intended to encourage foreign banks to locate in Florida. At the
same time, however, the legislation was intended to preserve and,
in some cases, to enhance the competitive position of domestic
banks.
II. INTEREST RATE PARITY
Without doubt, the most significant development in Florida
banking law in 1977 (and perhaps many years prior as well) was the
creation of section 687.12 of the Florida Statutes. As adopted, that
section provides that any lender or creditor licensed or chartered
under Florida law,' or located in Florida and licensed or chartered
under the laws of the United States, or lending through a mortgage
broker is authorized to charge interest at "the maximum rate of
interest permitted by law to be charged on similar loans or exten-
sions of credit made by any lender or creditor in the State of Flor-
ida."3
As a result, state banks or trust companies, as well as national
or Edge Act banks located in Florida, can now charge interest at
rates in excess4 of those prescribed in the general usury statute.5
Consequently, such institutions may charge as much as thirty per-
cent per annum on loans not exceeding $2,500, since small loan
companies are so authorized under the Florida Consumer Finance
Act.'
The ultimate impact of the interest parity among licensed lend-
ers and creditors, embodied in section 687.12 of the Florida Stat-
utes, may be contradictory. The enactment should serve to encour-
1. Lewis v. Bank of Pasco County, 346 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1977). For a discussion of this case
see text accompanying notes 63-70 supra.
2. FLA. STAT. ch. 516, 520, 654, 656, 657, or pt. XIV of ch. 627 (1977).
3. Id. § 687.12(1) (emphasis added).
4. Id. § 687.12(4).
5. Id. §§ 687.01-12.
6. Id. § 516.031.
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age state banks to consider more seriously the small loan market,
which has typically been neglected due to the fact that commercial
lending has been more profitable.7 Thus, the new legislation should
generate a better market in terms of availability of funds for the
borrower of small amounts. However, prior to the interest parity
legislation, state banks had participated in only a relatively small
proportion of the small loan business, and at substantially lower
interest than the small loan companies by virtue of the general
usury laws. As a result of section 687.12, the small borrower will no
doubt be paying an appreciably higher rate of interest on small
loans. These conflicting consequences suggest the weighty policy
decision involved in dealing with the desirability of free competition
among monetary institutions balanced against the need for fiscal
restraints on the cost of money.
The statute does prescribe two prerequisites to invocation of
interest rate parity. First, the lender or creditor must be authorized
by the respective laws under which he is licensed or organized to
make the particular loan or extension of credit.' Second, in making
loans or extensions of credit at a rate of interest that, but for the
statute, would not be authorized, lenders or creditors must indicate
on the promissory note or other evidence of indebtedness the specific
chapter of the Florida Statutes authorizing the interest rate
charged.'
III. INTERNATIONAL BANKING LAW
As of January 1, 1978,10 international banking corporations will
be permitted for the first time to open an international bank agency
or representative office in Florida." The purpose of the legislation
is to establish and to promote Florida as a center of international
commerce and trade. Florida's new invitation to foreign banks is
expected to induce significantly increased foreign investment and
trade, thus allowing Florida to compete with other states such as
New York, Illinois, California, Massachusetts, Washington and
Georgia, which have enacted similar legislation in an effort to pro-
mote their international banking communities.
7. See id. § 687.02.
8. Id. §687.12(2).
9. Id. § 687.12(4).
10. Id. § 658.08(3).
11. Id. § 659.67.
12. ST.FF OF HOUSE COMM. ON COMMERCE, REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL BANKING (1977).
13. E. BLOOM, HOUSE COMM. REPORT: LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND ECONOMIC IMPACT (1977).
The proposed International Banking Act of 1977 would, if enacted, preempt existing state
19781
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To establish a banking agency or representative office in Flor-
ida, an international banking corporation first must obtain a license
from the Department of Banking and Finance'4 [hereinafter re-
ferred to as "the Department"]. The most significant requirement
which must be met prior to issuance of a license is that the interna-
tional banking corporation must demonstrate that the actual value
of its assets is at least twenty-five million dollars in excess of its
liabilities.'5 The Department has indicated that it will impose this
minimum net worth requirement on applicants seeking to establish
only a representative office.'"
A licensed international banking corporation may have only
one place of doing business. 7 There has been no determination,
however, by the Department as to whether this restriction precludes
a licensed foreign bank from establishing a representative office and
an agency office at separate locations within the state.
Only banking corporations organized and licensed under the
laws of a foreign country may be licensed in Florida. 8 Although the
various types of foreign entities that may be deemed "banking cor-
porations" for purposes of obtaining a license are not set forth in the
statute, the International Banking Law Rules [hereinafter cited as
Proposed Rules] proposed by the Department indicates certain
guidelines to be used in determining whether an entity is engaged
in banking."
Under the Proposed Rules, the Department will review the
character and extent of the applicant's involvement in activities
such as receiving deposits of money from the public; purchasing,
selling, discounting, or negotiating for the public on a regular basis,
notes, drafts, checks, bills of exchange, acceptances or other evi-
dences of indebtedness; issuing letters of credit and so forth." This
broad and generic approach to determining whether a foreign corpo-
ration will be considered a banking corporation would presumably
regulations and establish a federal regulatory framework for subsidiaries, branches, and agen-
cies of international corporations.
14. FLA. STAT. § 659.67(5) (1977).
15. Id. § 659.67(5)(a). In view of the legislation's obvious purpose to make Florida com-
petitive with other international commercial communities, it is interesting to note that New
York, which has permitted international bank agencies as well as branches for several years,
only requires that the foreign bank's assets exceed its liabilities by one million dollars. N.Y.
BANKING LAW § 201-a (McKinney 1977).
16. Telephone conversation with G. Dolan, Director of Division of Banking, March 23,
1978.
17. FLA. STAT. § 659.67(6)(a) (1977).
18. Id. § 659.67(4).





place a greater number of entities under the licensing requirements
of the Department and ensure comprehensive regulation of interna-
tional banking activities in Florida.
Reciprocity is an additional prerequisite for obtaining a license
since no international banking corporation may be issued a license
"unless it is chartered in a country which permits any bank having
its principal place of business in the State of Florida to establish
similar facilities therein or exercise similar powers. ' '21 This require-
ment of reciprocity is applicable both to international banking cor-
porations seeking a license to transact a banking business as well
as to applicants for a representative office.22 Such a requirement
imposes a limitation on the number of foreign banks able to obtain
a license to establish a banking agency and, furthermore, may en-
gender certain administrative and constitutional difficulties.
While other states, most notably New York, California, Illinois
and Massachusetts, admit foreign banks on the assurance that the
foreign nation will allow the banks of those respective states bank-
ing privileges in the foreign nation, there is presently an open ques-
tion on whether the requirement of reciprocity stands on firm consti-
tutional grounds in view of the express delegation to the federal
government of control over commerce with foreign nations and over
foreign affairs in general.13 Indeed, serious doubts have been raised
regarding the constitutionality of the entire existing state statutory
scheme dealing with foreign banking.24
Administrative enforcement could require elaborate proof or
extensive investigation as to the existence of the required reciproc-
ity. The Proposed Rules attempt to lessen the burden of proving
reciprocity by stating that data as to existing activities of foreign
banks in the country in which the applicant is organized or a certifi-
cate of the appropriate bank supervisory authority thereof may suf-
fice. 5 The Proposed Rules avoid the harshness of a literal interpre-
tation of the reciprocity requirement and allow the Department
greater discretion and flexibility.
In determining whether the requisite reciprocity exists, the
criteria and terms and conditions of admission to a foreign coun-
try shall be considered sufficiently similar if, taken as a whole,
21. FLA. STAT. § 659.67(4)(b) (1977),
22. Id.
23. U.S. CONST. art. I], § 8. See also Edwards, Regulation of Foreign Banking in the
United States: International Reciprocity and Federal-State Conflicts, 13 COLut. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 239 (1974).
24. Foreign Banking in the United States, 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 593 (Spring 1973).
25. Proposed Rules, supra notes 13 & 19.
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with due regard to local banking practices, they are as favorable
as the criteria and terms and conditions existing in Florida."6
There are certain statutory restrictions on the permissible ac-
tivities of an international banking corporation. The statute pro-
vides that representative offices may not conduct any banking busi-
ness in the state," rather they may merely "act in a liaison capacity
with existing and potential customers of such international banking
corporation and . . .generate new loans and other activities for
such international banking corporation which is operating outside
of the state. 28 The Proposed Rules elaborate on the "other activi-
ties" which may be conducted at a representative office by provid-
ing that, in addition to loans, letters of credit and deposits may be
generated."
With respect to the permissible activities of international bank-
ing agencies, the statute imposes two significant restrictions. First,
a banking agency "is authorized to transact only such limited busi-
ness in [the] state as is clearly related to and is usual in interna-
tional or foreign business and financing international commerce." 3
This restriction on domestic lending activities has been character-
ized as "more theoretical than real" since it can be overcome by
"booking" loans at an office of the international banking corpora-
tion outside Florida.3
The second limitation on permissible activities of an interna-
tional banking agency is that "no such international banking corpo-
ration shall exercise fiduciary powers or receive deposits, but it may
maintain for the account of other credit balances necessarily inci-
dental to, or arising out of, the exercise of its lawful powers.""
While the concept of credit balance is new to Florida law, the
international banking community is familiar with the concept and
26. Id. at IV.
27. FLA. STAT. § 659.67(11) (1977).
28. Id. § 659.67(1)(d).
29. Proposed Rules, supra notes 13 & 19.
30. FLA. STAT. § 659.67(6)(e) (1977). The original bill contained no such limitation, but
provided that an international banking corporation having a licensed banking agency would
be authorized to conduct a general banking business in like manner as banks existing under
the laws of this state. No other states which permit foreign banks to engage in banking
activities have a similar legislative restriction.
31. Doss, Florida's Invitation to the International Banking Community, 51 FLA. B.J. 449,
451 (1977).
32. FLA. STAT. § 659.67(6)(3) (1977). This provision finds a counterpart in the legislation
of such states as Georgia and New York and is typically the substantive basis for the distinc-
tion between a branch office and an agency office of a foreign bank. Baines, The Fine Edge
of Prohibition: Interstate and Foreign Banking in the U.S., 93 BANKING L.J. 911 (1976).
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the law of other states, such as New York 33 and California 34 may
afford a definitional framework. Credit balances, often called
"limited-purpose" deposits, may be maintained by an international
banking agency as an incident to an integral part of the agency's
involvement with international business and the financing of foreign
commerce. Thus, a credit balance will arise as a result of loans to
customers where proceeds are not immediately disbursed, from pro-
ceeds of collections made for customers' accounts and funds deliv-
ered by customers to settle letters of credit accounts with the bank-
ing agency prior to settlement date. Quite obviously, international
banking agencies, which cannot accept local deposits, are precluded
from competing for traditional retail banking business and must
look elsewhere for funding sources.
IV. EXEMPTIONS FROM DOCUMENTARY STAMP TAXES
New section 201.23(d) of the Florida Statutes35 provides an ex-
emption from the imposition of Florida's documentary stamp tax
upon promissory notes, drafts and other certificates of indebtedness
when the maker, drawer or obligor resides outside the United States
and certain statutorily prescribed circumstances exist.
Previously, international financing transactions were chan-
neled into other states in an effort to avoid Florida's documentary
stamp tax. As with the International Banking Law,36 the legislative
purpose in providing the exemption for foreign transactions from the
provisions of chapter 201 of the Florida Statutes, is removal of an
impediment to the growth of international financing transactions in
Florida .31
The provision of broadest applicability, and therefore of great-
est probable impact, is found in section 201.23(1')(a) which exempts
from the excise taxes imposed by chapter 201, "all promissory notes
. . .and other written obligations to pay money. . . if the makers
thereof or the obligors thereunder, at the time of the making or
execution thereof, are individuals residing outside the United States
or business organizations or other persons located outside the
United States. ' 38 An important limitation to this exemption renders
the section inapplicable if a majority of the equity securities of any
33. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 202-a (McKinney 1970).
34. CAL. FIN. CODE § 1756.1 (West 1968).
35. FLA. STAT. § 201.23(d) (1977).
36. Id. § 659.67.
37. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON TAX AND CLAIMS, REPORT ON EXCISE TAX EXEMPTION OF
FOREIGN NomrS (1977).
38. FLA. STAT. § 201.23(l)(a) (1977).
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obligor or beneficiary of the financing is owned by persons residing
or organizations located within the United States." Clearly this
limitation excludes many multinational corporations and foreign
subsidiaries of American corporations from the benefits of the ex-
emption, thereby diminishing the intended effect of the legislation.
While it may reasonably be assumed that in referring to indi-
viduals, subsection (1)(a) requires that their legal residence be
maintained outside the United States, the statute does not provide
adequate guidance with respect to the word "located" in reference
to a business or other person. A question may arise with respect to
whether the intention is to equate the word "located" to the place
of "doing business," to the place of incorporation or to the principal
place of business.
Applying traditional rules of statutory construction, a pur-
ported grant of a tax exemption is strictly construed against a tax-
payer and in favor of the taxing authority." Literal application of
this rule, however, would result in a narrow construction of the
statute through the adoption of a "doing business" test for purposes
of determining whether a corporate obligor is "located" outside the
United States. A "doing business" test may present uncontem-
plated difficulties which would hamper full realization of the legis-
lative purpose behind the exemption. Various tests have emerged in
determining whether a corporation is "doing business" within a
given area which differ according to the purpose for which the in-
quiry is being made. Thus, increasing degrees of activity by a corpo-
ration are required to be shown in order to satisfy a "doing business"
test for purposes of in personam jurisdiction, imposition of corporate
income or franchise taxes, and regulation by state agencies.4' In
conclusion, the "doing business" test defies mechanical application
except in the most obvious cases. To require bankers and institu-
tional lenders to make the subtle distinctions with regard to the
degrees of activity undertaken by each foreign corporate borrower
at the risk of a statutory penalty would inevitably lead to confusion
and uncertainty.
Alternatively, another traditional rule of statutory construction
requires that a statute be construed, where possible, so as to carry
its legislative purpose into effect. 2 Denying the exemption afforded
under the statute to international corporations found merely to be
"doing business" within the United States would severely restrict
39. Id. § 201.23(2)(c).
40. State ex rel. Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Dickinson, 286 So. 2d 529, 530-31 (Fla. 1973).
41. THE CORPORATION TRUST Co., WHAT CONSTITUTES DOING BUSINESS 1-4 (1968).
42. Tyson v. Lanier, 156 So. 2d 833, 836 (Fla. 1963).
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the applicability of the exemption and thwart the legislative effort
to promote international banking activity in Florida. Under this
analysis, a substantial degree of activity within the United States
would be required to place the corporation outside the scope of the
exemption.
The place of incorporation test is also unsatisfactory because a
place of incorporation can easily be changed to avoid the tax. Ac-
cordingly, it is suggested that adoption of a "principal place of
business" test by the Department of Revenue would best reduce
uncertainty, ensure that the applicability of the statutory exemp-
tion is not unduly restricted and prevent the easy evasion of the tax.
A second exemption from the excise taxes imposed by chapter
201 of the Florida Statutes is provided by new subsection (1)(b) of
section 201.23 relating to drafts and bills of exchange drawn upon
and accepted by a bank having an office in Florida which arise out
of certain international trade transactions. At the date of accept-
ance, the drawer of the draft or bill of exchange, or the persons for
whose benefit the financing is conducted, must be individuals resid-
ing outside the United States or business organizations or other
persons located outside the United States. 3
Furthermore, the draft or bill of exchange must "arise out of
transactions involving the importation or exportation of goods or the
storage of goods abroad, or be drawn by banks or bankers in foreign
countries or dependencies or insular possessions of the United
States for the purpose of furnishing dollar exchange as required by
the usages of trade in the respective countries.""
As used in the statute, "importation or exportation of goods"
is not defined and, therefore, it is not clear whether the exemption
is limited solely to drafts arising out of transactions between the
United States and foreign countries. In this regard, reference might
be made to former Regulation C'3 of the Federal Reserve Board since
Florida's statute seems to regulate parallel subject matter. Therein,
"importation or exportation of goods" was defined as "the shipment
of goods between the United States and. . . any of its dependencies
or insular possessions, or between dependencies or insular posses-
sions and foreign countries, or between foreign countries ....
Since it would be inconsistent with the purpose of promoting
international banking to restrict the exemption to transactions in-
volving the importation and exportation between the United States
43. FLA. STAT. § 201.23(1)(b) (1977).
44. Id.
45. 12 C.F.R. § 203 (1974)(withdrawn April 1, 1974).
46. Id. § 203.1.
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and a foreign country and to exclude that of goods solely between
foreign countries, it would seem appropriate for Florida to employ
a definition similar to the one promulgated by the Federal Reserve
Board.
Subsection (2) of section 201.23 sets forth two exceptions to the
application of the foregoing exemptions. First, it is broadly stated
in subsection (2)(a) that the exemptions do not apply to "all mort-
gages, trust deeds, security agreements or other evidence of indebt-
edness relating to the purchase or transfer of real property located
in Florida filed and/or recorded in the state which shall be taxable
as if they were entered into within this state."47
As drafted, it appears that this exception is applicable to all
exemptions provided in chapter 201 of the Florida Statutes, and not
merely those relating to foreign transactions." Furthermore, the
exception provided in subsection (2) subtly dictates that irrespec-
tive of whether such documents are executed outside Florida, the
stamp tax shall be imposed when such documents relate to real
estate purchases or transfers and are filed and/or recorded in Flor-
ida, in effect treating them as if they were entered into in Florida.
This provision closely parallels and complements the 1977 amend-
ments to sections 201.0111 and 201.0810 of the Florida Statutes, al-
though those sections are not limited in application to real estate
financing transactions. The obvious purpose of these amendments
is to prevent circumvention of the excise tax by borrowers and lend-
ers, who may be tempted to play geographical games in order to
avoid a showing that an obligation was executed, removed from or
shipped into Florida." To further prevent avoidance of the stamp
tax, the amendments also require that the documentary stamps,
which were formerly affixed to the note or certificate of indebted-
ness, now be affixed to the mortgage or trust deed at the time of
recordation.2
A second exception to the application of the exemptions pro-
vided in section 201.23 is contained in subsection (2)(b) which pro-
vides that a nonresident maker of a promissory note is disqualified
47. FLA. STAT. § 201.23(2)(a) (1977).
48. Interestingly, the title to the legislation erroneously describes Senate Bill 254 as
providing in part "certain exemptions with respect to mortgages," 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-
463 (emphasis added), which, in conjunction with other discrepancies between the title and
section 201.23 as enacted, may render the statute vulnerable to constitutional attack. See
FLA. CONST. art. III, § 6.
49. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-414, § 1 (amending FLA. STAT. § 201.01 (1975)).
50. Id. § 2 (amending FLA. STAT. § 201.08 (1975)).
51. [1959-1960] FLA. ATr'v GEN. BIENNIAL REP. at 570.
52. FLA. STAT. §§ 201.01 & .08(1) (1977).
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from exemption if the purpose of the financing is to finance all or
any part of the purchase of real estate located in Florida or personal
property for use in Florida.13 This exception implements the legisla-
tive intent to exclude from the exemption any instrument designed
to finance Florida real estate and to provide exemptions only for
transactions wholly of international character. It is important to
note, however, that this exception does not apply to drafts and bills
of exchange involving the importation or exportation of goods.54
The obligee under a promissory note or other instrument de-
scribed in subsection (1)(a) of section 201.23 is entitled to rely on a
written certificate by the makers that no part of the proceeds of such
financing is intended for the purchase of Florida real estate or per-
sonal property for use in Florida." Similarly, the obligee under a
promissory note or the acceptee of a draft is entitled to rely on a
written certificate of each maker or obligor certifying that a majority
of its equity securities are not owned by residents of the United
States or businesses located in the United States." Presumably, one
entitled to rely on such certificates may still be liable for payment
of the excise tax if it is later determined that the transaction was
taxable. Such reliance, however, if reasonable, would preclude im-
position of the statutory penalty levied for failure to pay excise taxes
imposed under chapter 201.11
V. COMPETITIVE EQUALITY AND SECOND MORTGAGE LENDING
On July 1, 1976, section 658.051, of the Florida Statutes became
effective. Essentially, that section provides that, with the approval
of the Department, any state bank may exercise any power it could
exercise under federal statutes or regulation as if it were a federal
bank, except for any power in conflict with state law relating to
establishment of branch banks.58 The concept, of course, is to allow
the Department the flexibility to expand state bank powers to equal
those of national banks with the resultant effect of equalizing com-
petition.
The most significant utilization of this section came in 1977
with the ad hoc repeal of the limitations on second mortgage lending
53. Id. § 201.23(2)(b).
54. Id. § 201.23(1)(b).
55. Id. § 201.23(2)(b).
56. Id. § 201.23(2)(c).
57. The penalty for failure to pay the excise taxes due on a document was also amended
during the 1977 legislative session to provide an automatic penalty equal to twenty-five
percent of the purchase price of the stamps not affixed unless it is determined that the failure
to pay the tax is due to fraud, in which case a penalty in the amount of one hundred percent
of the deficiency is prescribed. Id. § 201.17.
58. Id. § 658.051.
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as prescribed by section 659.17(3)(d) of the Florida Statutes." Not-
withstanding the legislative restriction on second mortgage lending,
the Department has sanctioned by rule such loans subject only to
the limitations that: the property is residential; the combined value
of the first and second mortgages does not exceed seventy-five per-
cent of the property's appraised value; the mortgage is neither of the
purchase money nor balloon varieties; and the term of the mortgage
does not exceed ten years. 0
Thus, the Department has dulled the competitive edge that
national banks have traditionally wielded in Florida by permitting
state banks to vie for a more substantial portion of the overall sec-
ond mortgage loan portfolio.' The impact of this expansion should
be easily measurable in dollars and cents. It may, however, signal
the manner in which unbridled executive discretion could under-
mine a legislative choice in the name of competition. The expansive
power delegated to the Department pursuant to section 658.051 may
constitute an unconstitutional delegation of power because it con-
tains only vague limitations on this broad grant of power to an
executive body."2
VI. BANKING-IN-THE-SUNSHINE
Prior to the 1977 legislative revisions, section 658.10(1) of the
Florida Statutes provided, inter alia, that while bank or trust com-
pany applications, investigation reports and related information are
confidential communications, the same may be made public "with
the consent of the department." 3 With this apparent authority the
Comptroller expressed his intention to demand, and secure, from
banking corporations lists of all their stockholders and to release
such lists to the news media or otherwise open them for inspection
by the public.
To thwart such disclosure, a number of banks, as well as direc-
tors and stockholders of such banks, sought and prevailed to have
the section declared unconstitutional." The circuit court found that
the Department's authority to release information was an unconsti-
tutional delegation of power by the legislature because there were
no standards, guidelines or restrictions to limit or to regulate the
action of the Department in granting or withholding consent to
59. Id. § 659.17(3)(d) (1977).
60. 1 DEPT. BANKING & FIN. 3C-11.17.
61. See generally 12 U.S.C. § 371(a)(1) (1970).
62. E.g., Lewis v. Bank of Pasco County, 346 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1977).
63. FLA. STAT. § 658.10(1) (1975).
64. Lewis v. Bank of Pasco County, 346 So. 2d 53, 54 (Fla. 1977).
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make confidential information public.
The decision was appealed to the Supreme Court of Florida
which affirmed. A petition for rehearing was filed, but was denied.
A petition for clarification of the supreme court's opinion was filed
and was granted. In clarification, the supreme court restated the
circuit court opinion and emphasized "that statutes granting power
to administrative agencies must clearly announce adequate stan-
dards to guide the agencies in the execution of the powers dele-
gated.""
In reaction to the supreme court's decision, the Comptroller
complained that the effect of the opinion was to prohibit the De-
partment from carrying out its statutory duties in several respects."
First, the Department would be prohibited from providing informa-
tion to state and federal law enforcement agencies regarding crimi-
nal activity on the part of officers and directors of state banks.
Second, the Department would be prohibited from effectively par-
ticipating in public hearings before the Division of Administrative
Hearings.6"
Having successfully aroused the support of the Florida Bankers
Association and the Florida Legislature, the Comptroller was able
to gain passage of a replacement for section 658.10. The enactment
has been categorized as a "technical clean-up of a [sitatute due to
[slupreme [clourt action."" Pursuant to the new section, all bank
or trust company applications filed with the Department, including
all related information, are to be open to the public pursuant to
chapter 119 of the Florida Statutes and Departmental rules. How-
ever, certain information such as personal financial statements, re-
ports of examinations and, under certain circumstances, investiga-
tory records for civil or criminal law enforcement purposes are confi-
dential. Confidential information may be disclosed only pursuant to
a court order, legislative subpoena, or the order of a hearing officer.
The new section also amends section 659.25 of the Florida Stat-
utes, which prohibits any bank or trust company from permitting
any stockholder access to any books or records of the bank or trust
company other than its general statement book." The new section
provides that banks and trust companies must keep a current list
of their stockholders at their principal office. Furthermore, these
65. Id. at 54.
66. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON COMMERCE, REPORT ON CONFIDENTIALITY OF BANK RECORDS
(1977) [hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT].
67. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.50-.73 (1975).
68. STAFF REPORT, supra note 66.
69. FLA. STAT. § 659.25 (1975), repealed by 1976 Fla. Laws, ch. 76-168 § 3(2)(t)(effective
July 1, 1980).
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lists are now subject to the inspection of all stockholders of the bank
or trust company as well as the Department examiners, provided
that the Department shall not disclose or make public such lists.7o
VII. BRANCH BANKING REVISITED
In an effort to clarify the branch banking statutes, the 1977
Legislature enacted several additional revisions to section 659.06 of
the Florida Statutes.
First, subsection (1)(a) was revised to eliminate the outdated
requirement that the Department complete consideration of pend-
ing bank applications before action upon a branch application.71
Second, subsection (2)(a) was amended to provide that main bank-
ing room service facilities may be located on the property of or
contiguous to branch banks as well as that of the parent banks.
Third, subsection (2)(b) relating to drive-in and walkup facilities
was repealed.72 As a transitional measure, a grandfather clause was
enacted whereby such facilities existing immediately prior to the
date of repeal (June 27, 1977) were converted into branches and
automatically entitled to be licensed as such, although not included
or counted as one of the two branches which could be established
by the parent bank during 1977. 71
Finally, section 674.106 was added to the Uniform Commercial
Code chapter dealing with bank deposits and collections. This sec-
tion interfaces the branching concept of separateness of branches
and parent banks with the Code concept of notice by providing that
a branch is a separate bank for the purpose of computing the time
in which and determining the place at which action may be taken
or notices or orders given under chapters 673 and 674 of the Florida
Statutes. This provision was, in fact, suggested by the American
Law Institute in the 1962 Code."
In addition, the legislature added nonuniform language to sec-
tion 674.106 by further providing that receipt of any notice or order
by, or the knowledge of, one branch of a bank is not actual or
constructive notice to or knowledge of any other branch of the same
bank and does not impair the right of such other branch to be a
holder in due course of an item.
70. As originally proposed, subsection 5 would have permitted public disclosure of share-
holders' lists of state banks.
71. FLA. STAT. § 659.06(1)(a)(1) (1977).
72. Id. § 659.06(2)(b) (repealing FLA. STAT. § 659.06(2)(b) (1975)).
73. Id. § 659.06(1)(a)(1).
74. Id. § 674.106.
75. U.C.C. § 4-106 (1962 version).
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As already mentioned, this provision is another instance of non-
uniformity of Florida's Code. The concept, however, is supported by
the Official Comments to the 1962 version of the Code, which also
suggest the legal effect of the additional language." As stated
therein:
[wihether a branch has notice sufficient to affect its status
as a holder in due course of an item taken by it should depend
upon what notice that branch has received with respect to the
item. Similarly the receipt of a stop payment order at one branch
should not be notice to another branch so as to impair the right
of the second branch to be a holder in due course of the item,
although in circumstances in which ordinary care requires the
communication of a notice or order to the proper branch of a
bank, such notice would be effective at such proper branch from
the time it was received or should have been received.77
VIII. ANTI-BOYCOTr
By recent statute, the legislature has sought to limit the extent
to which domestic and foreign corporations doing business in Flor-
ida can engage in discriminatory practices to further, comply with,
or support a foreign boycott. The statute applies to business entities
which accept letters of credit or other documents evidencing credit
transfers, as well as those which contract for the exchange or pur-
chase of commodities, if such documents contain a discriminatory
provision. Such clauses, as proscribed, would typically require dis-
crimination against, or refusal to engage in commerce with, third
persons or groups on the basis of sex, race, religion or national ori-
gin. Such activity on the part of corporations doing business in
Florida will be deemed an unlawful combination in restraint of
trade .
In addition to prohibiting express contractual provisions, the
statute condemns as an unlawful restraint of trade certain conduct
such as requesting or furnishing "information with regard to or re-
flective of the place where commodities were not manufactured or
did not originate for the use of a foreign country, its nationals, or
residents in order to comply with, further or support a foreign boy-
cott. ' 79 Despite the tortuous language, the obvious purpose of the
statute is to proscribe private restrictions on international trade.
Proof of intent to comply with or support a foreign boycott is
76. Id. § 4-106, comment 4 (1962 version).
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. FLA. STAT. § 542.13.
79. Id. § 542.13(1)(d).
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not explicitly required, although it is arguable that such proof would
be necessary in order to show, for example, that a bank refused to
accept a letter of credit "on the ground that it does not contain such
a discriminatory provision or certification in order to comply with,
further or support a foreign boycott."80
The statutory penalties for unlawful restraint of trade are
harsh. They include forfeiture of a domestic corporation's charter,8"
denial of a foreign corporation's right to do business within this
state,82 and criminal liability. 3
In view of recent amendments to the federal Export Adminis-
tration Act, 4 the Florida Legislature's constitutional power to enact
laws intended to proscribe foreign boycotts may be seriously ques-
tioned. The history and purpose of the Export Administration Act
reveals that it is the policy of the federal government to oppose
restrictive state practices or boycotts sponsored or imposed against
other countries friendly to the United States.8 1 It would appear,
therefore, that Congress has preempted this subject matter under
its express power to regulate commerce with foreign nations. Fur-
thermore, given the potential of the Florida anti-boycott statute to
obstruct or embarrass federal foreign policy, this new legislation
may well be vulnerable to constitutional challenge under traditional
principles of federalism.87
IX. CONVENIENCE ACCOUNTS
Section 659.292 of the Florida Statutes, as enacted by the 1977
legislature, creates a new species of bank accounts: the convenience
account.88 As defined therein, a convenience account is a demand
deposit in the name of one individual (principal) in which one or
more other individuals have been designated as agent with the right
only to withdraw funds from or draw checks on such account."
Section 659.292 provides that the agency relationship created
under the convenience account is not affected by the subsequent
80. Id. § 542.13(1)(b).
81. Id. § 542.02.
82. Id. § 542.04.
83. Id. § 542.05.
84. 50 U.S.C.A. § 2401 (Supp. 1977).
85. Antco Shipping Co. v. Siderman S.pA., 417 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd
mem., 553 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1977).
.86. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 8, cl. 3.
87. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 492 (1968); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of
Comm'rs, 276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1969).




death or incompetence of the principal. This concept goes even
further to abolish the common law rule that the death of a principal
is considered as an instantaneous and absolute revocation of the
authority of his agent, except when the agent's power is coupled
with an interest.' While the new statute preserves the agency rela-
tionship beyond the principal's death or incompetency, it does not
vest the agent with survivorship rights in the account as, for exam-
ple, in the case of a joint account." Presumably, the agent's rights
in the account are for the benefit of the principal or his heirs or
legatees. Indeed, a bank's right of setoff against the account is lim-
ited to the indebtedness of the principal to the bank." What the
statute does, however, is insulate the bank from claims resulting
from withdrawals by the agent which are misapplied or outside the
scope of the agency. 3
X. PREPAYMENT OF PROMISSORY NOTES
As a general rule of common law, the payee of an instrument is
under no obligation to accept payment thereon prior to maturity.,4
The 1977 legislature, however, has created section 697.06 of the
Florida Statutes. This section provides that any note which is silent
as to the right of the payor to make prepayment may be prepaid in
full without penalty. Since the legislature indicated that a note
"may be prepaid in full," rules of strict statutory construction
would suggest, therefore, that common law principles endure as to
partial prepayment, the same being outside the scope of the section.
XI. ACCRUAL OF CAUSES OF ACTION-DEMAND NOTES
Prior to the 1977 revisions to sections 95.031(1) and
673.122(1)(b), there existed a conflict as to when a cause of action
accrued on a demand instrument and when the statute of limita-
tions tolled on such action. Specifically, section 95.031(1) provided
that a cause of action on a demand note accrued on the first written
demand for payment, whereas section 673.122(1)(b) provided that
such a cause of action accrued upon the date of the note or, if no
date were stated, on the date of issue.
90. FLA. STAT. § 709.01 (1975) was the first encroachment on this common law principle.
That section validates the acts of an agent done after the death of the principal in the absence
of knowledge of the death by a third party dealing with the agent. See Comment, Revocation
of Agency by Death of Principal, 1 MIAMI L.Q. 107 (1947).
91. FLA. STAT § 659.291 (1975), repealed by 1976 Fla. Laws, ch. 76-168 § 3 (effective July
1, 1980).
92. FLA. STAT. § 659.292(5) (1977).
93. Id. § 659.292(4).
94. 10 C.J.S. Bills & Notes § 462 (1955).
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By virtue of the revisions, in the case of a demand instrument,
other than a note payable on demand, a cause of action accrues
against the maker or an acceptor upon its date or, if no date is
stated, on the date of issue. In the case of a note payable on demand,
a cause of action accrues against the maker, any endorser or guaran-
tor upon the first written demand for payment.
XII. DISPOSITION OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY
The 1977 revisions to the Unclaimed Property Act 5 as it per-
tains to banking organizations were relatively minor. First, the term
"banking organization" was redefined to explicitly include national
as well as state banks." Second, the period of dormancy was reduced
from fifteen years to ten years, except in the case of traveler's
checks .
95. FLA. STAT. §§ 717.01-30 (1977).
96. Id. § 717.02(1).
97. Id. § 717.03.
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